Vrijheid Radio 12

Een beetje net doen alsof de VS nooit een invoerheffing gehad hebben. Dit is wat Grok erover te zeggen heeft:

Yes, the United States had tariffs in place long before Donald Trump’s presidency and his so-called “tariff war.” Tariffs have been a part of U.S. economic policy since the country’s founding, starting with the Tariff Act of 1789, which was one of the first laws passed by the new Congress to raise revenue for the federal government.
Over the centuries, tariffs fluctuated based on economic priorities and political philosophies. For much of the 19th century, they were a primary source of federal revenue, often set high to protect domestic industries—like during the 1828 “Tariff of Abominations” or the 1890 McKinley Tariff. By the early 20th century, the U.S. began shifting toward lower tariffs with the 1913 Underwood Tariff and later embraced freer trade after World War II through agreements like the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which evolved into the World Trade Organization (WTO).
Before Trump took office in 2017, the U.S. still maintained tariffs, though they were relatively low compared to historical highs. In 2016, the average U.S. tariff rate on industrial goods was about 2.8%, with specific duties varying by product—higher on things like agriculture (e.g., 5-10% on some goods) and lower or zero on others under trade deals like NAFTA. These were negotiated rates, often reciprocal with trading partners.
Trump’s “tariff war,” starting in 2018, marked a shift in scale and approach—imposing broad, unilateral tariffs, like 25% on steel and 10% on aluminum, and escalating duties on Chinese goods (some reaching 25% or more). This was a departure from the post-WWII trend of gradual tariff reduction, but it built on a system that already existed, not one he created from scratch. So, yes, tariffs predate Trump by over two centuries; his policies just amplified their use and visibility.

Volgens Grok is het wel zo dat de tarieven in de VS wat lager waren dan andere landen en continenten. Dus je zou kunnen argumenteren dat Trump een inhaalslag maakt en gebruikt daarbij een berekening die het handelstekort van de VS met het betreffende land verrekend. Wat hierbij wel grappig is is dat de Heard and McDonald eilanden ook een tarief van 10% hebben gekregen van ’the Donald’. Alleen, er wonen geen mensen op de Heard en McDonald eilanden, wel een heleboel pinguins.
https://x.com/TheMaineWonk/status/1907551600383857056

Yes, U.S. tariffs are generally lower than those of many other countries, especially when looking at average applied rates before Trump’s tariff escalations. The comparison depends on the metric—average tariffs, trade-weighted averages, or specific sectors—and the time frame, but here’s the breakdown.
Pre-2018, the U.S. had an average applied tariff rate of about 3.4% across all goods, according to the World Bank’s data on Most Favored Nation (MFN) rates. For industrial goods, it was even lower, around 2.8%, with many products entering duty-free under trade agreements like NAFTA or WTO commitments. Compare that to the global average MFN tariff of about 7.1% in 2016, and the U.S. was well below the norm. Developing countries often have higher averages—India’s was around 13%, Brazil’s 13.5%, and China’s about 9.9%. Even some developed economies, like the EU, had a slightly higher average at 5.1%, though it varies by sector (e.g., EU agricultural tariffs can hit 20-30% on certain goods).
Trade-weighted averages, which factor in the volume of goods actually imported, tell a similar story. The U.S. rate was about 2.5% in 2016, per the WTO, reflecting its large share of low- or zero-tariff imports. Contrast that with Canada (3.1%), Japan (2.1%), or higher outliers like South Korea (7.1%) and Mexico (4.4%). Developing nations again skew higher—India’s trade-weighted average was over 6%, and Brazil’s neared 8%.
Trump’s tariffs bumped things up—by 2020, the U.S. trade-weighted average rose to about 3.5-4%, with spikes on steel (25%) and Chinese goods (up to 21% in some cases). Even then, it remained below many peers. China’s effective tariffs, for instance, stayed higher (around 7-8% trade-weighted), and India’s hovered near 10%. The EU, post-Trump adjustments, kept its average around 3-4%, still competitive but not as low as the U.S. pre-2018.
The U.S. benefits from a large domestic market and trade deals that keep duties low, while other countries—especially emerging economies—use tariffs for revenue or protectionism. So, yes, U.S. tariffs have historically been lower than most, even after Trump’s hikes, though the gap narrowed slightly. Sector-specific exceptions (like U.S. sugar tariffs at 15-20%) exist, but the overall picture holds.

“Als tariffs zo slecht zijn, waarom hebben alle landen nog steeds hogere invoerbelasting dan de US?”
https://x.com/BobMurphyEcon/status/1908580700355166568

Mooie quotes van Musk. Ik haal deze er even uit om wat meer licht te laten schijnen over de achtergronden van de tarievenoorlog:

“Shifting focus, Musk addressed President Donald Trump’s tariffs, advocating for a zero-tariff free trade zone between Europe and North America. He emphasized greater economic integration and urged Trump to ease restrictions on individuals living and working across the two regions.

“I’m hopeful that the United States and Europe can move, ideally in my view, to a zero-tariff situation. Effectively creating a free trade zone between Europe and North America,” Musk said. “That’s what I hope occurs, and also more freedom for people to move between Europe and the U.S. If they wish to work in Europe or America, they should be allowed to do so, in my view. That has certainly been my advice to the President,” the billionaire added.

De bedoeling is dus om tarieven te verwijderen door ze eerst radicaal te verhogen. Dat zal onderhandelaarslogica zijn. We zullen zien hoe het verder gaat. Ik ben er niet gerust op.

Gesproken over achtergronden van de tarievenoorlog, hier het Triffin-dilemma: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Triffin_dilemma

“In international finance, the Triffin dilemma (sometimes the Triffin paradox) is the conflict of economic interests that arises between short-term domestic and long-term international objectives for countries whose currencies serve as global reserve currencies. This dilemma was identified in the 1960s by Belgian-American economist Robert Triffin. He noted that a country whose currency is the global reserve currency, held by other nations as foreign exchange (FX) reserves to support international trade, must somehow supply the world with its currency in order to fulfill world demand for these FX reserves. This supply function is nominally accomplished by international trade, with the country holding reserve currency status being required to run an inevitable trade deficit.[1] After going off of the gold standard in 1971 and setting up the petrodollar system later in the 1970s, the United States accepted the burden of such an ongoing trade deficit in 1985 with its permanent transformation from a creditor to a debtor nation.”

In gewone mensentaal: als je de wereldreservemunt hebt, dan stijgt de vraag hiernaar enorm omdat alle internationale handel in die munt gesettled wordt. Doe je niets dan stijgt de waarde van de munt enorm. Immers, sterk toenemende vraag bij gelijk aanbod doet de prijs stijgen. Dat vinden landen meestal niet leuk omdat je dan deflatie krijgt en overheden denken dat mensen hun muntjes niet meer willen uitgeven. Gevolgmatig gaan landen veel geld drukken en daarmee spulletjes kopen om vraag en aanbod naar de munt min of meer constant te houden. Dat lukt dan ook redelijk. Alleen, je bouwt een gigantische schuld op. Daarnaast ook een groot handelstekort.

Trump lijkt nu het Triffin-dilemma (meer de gevolgen daarvan zijnde de schuld en het handelstekort) te willen adresseren via een tarievenoorlog. Ik betwijfel of dat gaat lukken. Beter is het afstand te doen van de status van wereldreservemunt. Bitcoin is de ideale opvolger omdat niemand zich zorgen maakt over de onvermijdelijke, gigantische prijsstijgingen.

Onderhandelinks-tactiek eerder. Hij heeft wel eens toegegeven (in The Art of the Deal?) dat hij graag groot inzet en daarna wel ziet wat er uit komt.

Poedel EU zit nu al kwijlend naar het baasje te kijken om aandacht te krijgen. Ze willen een deal maken en consessies doen. Volgens de media. Dat ging snel…

Wat Musk wil met een soort van vrijhandelszone tussen EU en US, inclusief makkelijker kunnen verhuizen tussen de twee gebieden is op zich interessant. De vraag is hoe dit in de praktijk gaat werken.