Het PNAC is een van de invloedrijkste neoconservatieve denktanks. Het heeft ten doel het wereldleiderschap van de VS te bevorderen. Dit artikel gaat in op het rapport “Rebuilding America’s Defenses”, dat het PNAC in september 2000 publiceerde. Sinds 9/11 speelt dit een hoofdrol in de defensiepolitiek van President Bush. Onderstaand artikel geeft een samenvatting van dit programma. In hoeverre zal het Congres hierin meegaan ?
Het PNAC is gebaseerd op twee veronderstellingen: dat Amerikaans leiderschap goed is voor Amerika en voor de wereld en dat zulk leiderschap, dat zich beroept op een moreel beginsel, berust op militaire macht en diplomatieke inspanning. Het PNAC is een non-profit organisatie, die in 1997 werd opgericht door William Kristol en Robert Kagan. In het rapport van 2000 wordt een neoconservatieve visie gegeven op de mondiale rol van de VS in de 21e eeuw en op welke manier het defensie-apparaat daarvoor zou moeten worden hervormd en ingezet.
“America has a vital role in maintaining peace and security in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. If we shirk our responsibilities, we invite challenges to our fundamental interests. The history of the 20th century should have taught us that it is important to shape circumstances before crises emerge, and to meet threats before they become dire. The history of the past century should have taught us to embrace the cause of American leadership.” (from the Statement of Principles)
At present the United States faces no global rival. America’s grand strategy should aim to preserve and extend this advantageous position as far into the future as possible.
The challenge for the coming century is to preserve and enhance this “American peace.”
Yet unless the United States maintains sufficient military strength, this opportunity will be lost. And in fact, over the past decade, the failure to establish a security strategy responsive to new realities and to provide adequate resources for the full range of missions needed to exercise U.S. global leadership has placed the American peace at growing risk. This report attempts to define those requirements. In particular, we need to:
ESTABLISH FOUR CORE MISSIONS for U.S. military forces:
–defend the American homeland;
–fight and decisively win multiple, simultaneous major theater wars;
–perform the “constabulary” duties associated with shaping the security environment in critical regions;
–transform U.S. forces to exploit the “revolution in military affairs;
To carry out these core missions, we need to provide sufficient force and budgetary allocations. In particular, the United States must:
MAINTAIN NUCLEAR STRATEGIC SUPERIORITY, basing the U.S. nuclear deterrent upon a global, nuclear net assessment that weighs the full range of current and emerging threats, not merely the U.S.-Russia balance.
RESTORE THE PERSONNEL STRENGTH of today’s force to roughly the levels anticipated in the “Base Force” outlined by the Bush Administration, an increase in active-duty strength from 1.4 million to 1.6 million.
REPOSITION U.S. FORCES to respond to 21st century strategic realities by shifting permanently-based forces to Southeast Europe and Southeast Asia, and by changing naval deployment patterns to reflect growing U.S. strategic concerns in East Asia.
MODERNIZE CURRENT U.S. FORCES SELECTIVELY, proceeding with the F-22 program while increasing purchases of lift, electronic support and other aircraft; expanding submarine and surface combatant fleets; purchasing Comanche helicopters and medium-weight ground vehicles for the Army, and the V-22 Osprey “tilt-rotor” aircraft for the Marine Corps.
CANCEL “ROADBLOCK” PROGRAMS such as the Joint Strike Fighter, CVX aircraft carrier, and Crusader howitzer system that would absorb exorbitant amounts of Pentagon funding while providing limited improvements to current capabilities. Savings from these canceled programs should be used to spur the process of military transformation.
DEVELOP AND DEPLOY GLOBAL MISSILE DEFENSES to defend the American homeland and American allies, and to provide a secure basis for U.S. power projection around the world.
CONTROL THE NEW “INTERNATIONAL COMMONS” OF SPACE AND “CYBERSPACE,” and pave the way for the creation of a new military service – U.S. Space Forces – with the mission of space control.
EXPLOIT THE “REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS” to insure the long term superiority of U.S. conventional forces. Establish a two-stage transformation process which:
— maximizes the value of current weapons systems through the application of advanced
— produces more profound improvements in military capabilities, encourages competition
between single services and joint-service experimentation efforts.
INCREASE DEFENSE SPENDING gradually to a minimum level of 3.5 to 3.8 percent of gross domestic product, adding $15 billion to $20 billion to total defense spending annually.
I. WHY ANOTHER DEFENSE REVIEW?
21st Century Security system: Cold War:Bipolar -> 21st Century: Unipolar
Strategic goal: Cold War: Contain Soviet Union -> 21st Century: Preserve Pax Americana
Main military mission(s): Cold War: Deter Soviet expansionism -> 21st Century: Secure and expand zones of democratic peace; deter rise of new great-power competitor; defend key regions; exploit transformation of war
Main military threat(s): Cold War: Potential global war across many theaters ->21st Century: Potential theater wars spread across globe
Focus of strategic competition: Cold War:Europe ->21st Century: East Asia
Today, America spends less than 3 percent of its gross domestic product on national defense, less than at any time since before the United States established itself as the world’s leading power.
II. FOUR ESSENTIAL MISSIONS
None of the defense reviews of the past decade has weighed fully the range of missions demanded by U.S. global leadership, nor adequately quantified the forces and resources necessary to execute these missions successfully.
America must defend its homeland. During the Cold War, nuclear deterrence was the key element in homeland defense; it remains essential. But the new century has brought with it new challenges. While reconfiguring its nuclear force, the United States also must counteract the effects of the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction that may soon allow lesser states to deter U.S. military action by threatening U.S. allies and the American homeland itself. Of all the new and current missions for U.S. armed forces, this must have priority.
Second, the United States must retain sufficient forces able to rapidly deploy and win multiple simultaneous large-scale wars and also to be able to respond to unanticipated contingencies in regions where it does not maintain forward-based forces.
This resembles the “two-war” standard that has been the basis of U.S. force planning over the past decade. Yet this standard needs to be updated to account for new realities and potential new conflicts.
CONSTABULARY DUTIES. Third, the Pentagon must retain forces to preserve the current peace in ways that fall short of conduction major theater campaigns. A decade’s experience and the policies of two administrations have shown that such forces must be expanded to meet the needs of the new, long-term NATO mission in the Balkans, the continuing no-fly-zone and other missions in Southwest Asia, and other presence missions in vital regions of East Asia. These duties are today’s most frequent missions, requiring forces configured for combat but capable of long-term, independent constabulary operations.
TRANSFORM U.S. ARMED FORCES. Finally, the Pentagon must begin now to exploit the socalled “revolution in military affairs,” sparked by the introduction of advanced technologies into military systems; this must be regarded as a separate and critical mission worthy of a share of force structure and defense budgets.
The administration’s stewardship of the nation’s deterrent capability has been described by Congress as “erosion by design.”
The Joint Chiefs have admitted they lack the forces necessary to meet the two-war benchmark.
For the United States to retain the technological and tactical advantages it now enjoys, the transformation effort must be considered as pressing a military mission as preparing for today’s theater wars.
III. REPOSITIONING TODAY’S FORCE
Guarding the American security perimeter today – and tomorrow – will require changes in U.S. deployments and installations overseas.
In Southeast Asia, American forces are too sparse to address rising security requirements adequately.
It would be wise to reduce the frequency of carrier presence in the Mediterranean and the Gulf while increasing U.S. Navy presence in the Pacific.
IV. REBUILDING TODAY’S ARMED SERVICES
Elements of U.S. Army Europe should be redeployed to Southeast Europe, while a permanent unit should be based in the Persian Gulf region.
Likewise, as high-intensity combat changes, the Army must find new ways to recruit and retain soldiers with hightechnology skills, perhaps creating partnerships with industry for extremely skilled reservists, or considering some skills as justifying a warrant-officer, rather than an enlisted, rank structure. In particular, the Army should:
–Be restored in active-duty strength and structure to meet the requirements of its current missions. Overall active strength should rise to approximately 525,000 soldiers from the current strength of 475,000. Much of this increase should bolster the overdeployed and under-manned units that provide combat support and combat service support, such as military intelligence, military police, and other similar units.
–Undertake selective modernization efforts, primarily to increase its tactical and operational mobility and increase the effectiveness of current combat systems through “digitization” – the process of creating tactical information networks. The Army should accelerate its plans to purchase medium-weight vehicles, acquire the Comanche helicopter and the HIMARS rocket-artillery system; likewise, the heavy Crusader artillery system, though a highly capable howitzer, is an unwise investment given the Army’s current capabilities and future needs, and should be canceled.
–Improve the combat readiness of current units by increasing personnel strength and revitalizing combat training.
–Make efforts to improve the quality of soldier life to sustain the current “middle class,” professional Army.
–Be repositioned and reconfigured in light of current strategic realities:
elements of U.S. Army Europe should be redeployed to Southeast Europe, while a permanent unit should be based in the Persian Gulf region; simultaneously, forward-deployed Army units should be reconfigured to be better capable of independent operations that include ongoing constabulary missions as well as the initial phases of combat.
–Reduce the strength of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve, yet recognize that these components are meant to provide a hedge against a genuine, large-scale, unanticipated military emergency; the continuing reliance on large numbers of reservists for constabulary missions is inappropriate and short-sighted.
–Have its budget increased from the current level of $70 billion annually to $90 to $95 billion per year.
Returning the National Guard to its traditional role would allow for a reduction in strength while lessening the strain of repeated contingency operation deployments. American landpower is the essential link in the chain that translates U.S. military supremacy into American geopolitical preeminence.
In addition to terminating the Crusader artillery program, the Army’s annual budget must increase to the $90 to $95 billion level to finance current missions and the Army’s longterm transformation.
THE AIR FORCE
In particular, the Air Force should:
–Be redeployed to reflect the shifts in international politics. Independent, expeditionary air wings containing a broad mix of aircraft, including electronic warfare, airborne command and control, and other support aircraft, should be based in Italy, Southeastern Europe, central and perhaps eastern Turkey, the Persian Gulf, and Southeast Asia.
–Realign the remaining Air Force units in Europe, Asia and the United States to optimize their capabilities to conduct multiple large-scale air campaigns.
–Make selected investments in current generations of combat and support aircraft to sustain the F-15 and F-16 fleets for longer service life, purchase additional sets of avionics for specialmission fighters, increase planned fleets of AWACS, JSTARS and other electronic support planes, and expand stocks of precision-guided munitions.
–Develop plans to increase electronic warfare support fleets, such as by creating “Wild Weasel” and jammer aircraft based upon the F-15E airframe.
–Restore the condition of the institutional Air Force, expanding its personnel strength, rebuilding its corps of pilots and experienced maintenance NCOs, expanding support specialties such as intelligence and special police and reinvigorating its training establishment.
–Overall Air Force active personnel strength should be gradually increased by approximately 30,000 to 40,000, and the service should rebuild a structure of 18 to 19 active and 8 reserve wing equivalents.
Air Combat Command, the main tactical fighter command based in the United States, has suffered a 50 percent drop in readiness rates.
The Air Force’s fleets of support aircraft are too small for rapid, large-scale Deployments and sustained operations.
The Joint Strike Fighter, with limited capabilities and significant technical risk, is a roadblock to future transformation and a sink-hole for needed defense funds.
The Navy must begin to reduce its heavy dependence on carrier operations.
To meet the strategic need for naval power today, the Navy should be realigned and reconfigured along these lines:
–Reflecting the gradual shift in thefocus of American strategic concerns toward East Asia, a majority of the U.S. fleet, including two thirds of all carrier battle groups, should be concentrated in the Pacific. A new, permanent forward base should be established in Southeast Asia.
–The Navy must begin to transition away from its heavy dependence on carrier operations, reducing its fleet from 12 to nine carriers over the next six years. A moratorium on carrier construction should be imposed after the completion of the CVN-77, allowing the Navy to retain a ninecarrier force through 2025. Design and research on a future CVX carrier should continue, but should aim at a radical design change to accommodate an air wing based primarily on unmanned aerial vehicles. The Navy should complete the F/A-18E/F program, refurbish and modernize its support aircraft, consider the suitability of a carrier-capable version of the Air Force’s F-22, but keep the Joint Strike Fighter program in research and development until the implications of the revolution in military affairs for naval warfare are understood better.
–To offset the reduced role of carriers, the Navy should slightly increase its fleets of current- generation surface combatants and submarines for improved strike capabilities in littoral waters and to conduct an increasing proportion of naval presence missions with surface action groups. Additional investments in countermine warfare are needed, as well.
The Navy has built up a ‘modernization deficit’ – of surface ships, submarines and aircraft – that will soon approach $100 billion.
The Navy’s surface fleet is too small to meet current requirements, war plans and future missile defense duties.
To maintain its unique and valuable role, the Marine Corps should:
–Be expanded to permit the forward basing of a second Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) in East Asia. This MEU should be based in Southeast Asia along with the repositioned Navy carrier battle group as described above.
–Likewise be increased in strength by about 25,000 to improve the personnel status of Marine units, especially nondeployed units undergoing training.
–Be realigned to create lighter units with greater infantry strength and better abilities for joint operations, especially including other services’ fires in support of Marine operations.
The Marine Corps should review its unit and force structure to eliminate marginal capabilities.
–Accelerate the purchase of V-22 aircraft and the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle to improve ship-to-shore maneuver, and increase tactical mobility and range.
Navy Department spending should be increased to between $100 and $110 Billion annually.
V. CREATING TOMORROW’S DOMINANT FORCE
The effects of the RMA will have profound implications for how wars are fought, what weapons dominate, and which nations enjoy military preeminence.
In general, to maintain American military preeminence that is consistent with the requirements of a strategy of American global leadership, tomorrow’s U.S. armed forces must meet three new missions:
–Global missile defenses. A network against limited strikes, capable of protecting the United States, its allies and forward-deployed forces, must be constructed. This must be a layered system of land, sea, air and spacebased components.
–Control of space and cyberspace. Much as control of the high seas – and the protection of international commerce – defined global powers in the past, so will control of the new “international commons” be a key to world power in the future. An America incapable of protecting its interests or that of its allies in space or the “infosphere” will find it difficult to exert global political leadership.
–Pursuing a two-stage strategy for of transforming conventional forces. In exploiting the “revolution in military affairs,” the Pentagon must be driven by the enduring missions for U.S. forces. This process will have two stages: transition, featuring a mix of current and new systems; and true transformation, featuring new systems, organizations and operational concepts. This process must take a competitive approach, with services and joint-service operations competing for new roles and missions. Any successful process of transformation must be linked to the services, which are the institutions within the Defense Department with the ability and the responsibility for linking budgets and resources to specific missions.
To increase their effectiveness, ground-based interceptors like the Army’s Theater High-Altitude Area Defense System must be networked to space-based systems
The Clinton Administration’s adherence to the 1972 ABM Treaty has frustrated development of useful ballistic missile defenses.
In the future, it will be necessary to unite the current SPACECOM vision for control of space to the institutional responsibilities and interests of a separate military service.
Until the process of transformation is treated as an enduring military mission – worthy of a constant allocation of dollars and forces – it will remain stillborn.
Toward a 21st Century Army
In particular the process of Army transformation should:
–Move ahead with experiments to create new kinds of independent units using systems now entering final development and early procurement – such as the V-22 tilt-rotor aircraft and the HIMARS light-weight rocket artillery system – capable of longerrange operations and selfdeployments. Once mature, such units would replace forward-based heavy forces.
–Experiment vigorously to understand the long-term implications of the revolution in military affairs for land forces. In particular, the Army should develop ways to deploy and maneuver against adversaries with improved long-range strike capabilities.
THE AIR FORCE
Therefore, the Air Force should:
–Complete its planned F-22 procurement while terminating its participation in the JSF program and upgrading the capabilities of existing tactical aircraft, especially by purchasing additional precision munitions and developing new ones and increasing numbers of support
aircraft to allow for longer-range operations and greater survivability;
–Increase efforts to develop long-range and high-endurance unmanned aerial vehicles, not merely for reconnaissance but for strike and even air-combat missions;
–Pursue the development of largebodied stealthy aircraft for a variety of roles, including lift, refueling, and other support missions as well as strike missions.
–Target significant new investments toward creating capabilities for operating in space, ncluding inexpensive launch vehicles, new satellites and transatmospheric vehicles, in preparation for a decision as to whether space warfare is sufficiently different from combat within earth’s atmosphere so as to require a separate “space service.”
Navy transformation should be a two-phase process:
–Near-term Navy transformation should accelerate the construction of planned generations of 21st century surface combatants with increased stealth characteristics, improved and varied missiles and long-range guns for strikes ashore. Efforts to implement “network-centric” warfare under the cooperative engagement concept should be accelerated. The Navy should begin to tructure itself for its emerging role in missile defenses, determining, for example, whether current surface combatant vessels and a traditional rotational deployment scheme are apropos for this mission.
–In the longer term, the Navy must determine whether its current focus on littoral operations can be sustained under a transformed paradigm of naval warfare and how to retain control of open-ocean areas in the future. Experiments in operating varied fleets of UAVs should begin now, perhaps employing a retired current carrier. Consideration should be directed toward other forms of unmanned sea and air vehicles and toward an expanded role for submarines.
The Navy should consider using a deactivated carrier to better understand the possibilities and problems of operating large fleets of UAVs at sea.
VI. DEFENSE SPENDING
Use of the post- Cold War “peace dividend” to balance the federal budget has created a “defense deficit” totaling tens of billions of dollars annually.
If defense spending remains at current levels, U.S. forces will soon be too old or too small.
The program we advocate – one that would provide America with forces to meet the strategic demands of the world’s sole superpower – requires budget levels to be increased to 3.5 to 3.8 percent of the GDP.